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Abstract
Does nancial development exacerbate or dampen nancial am-
plication? This paper develops a macroeconomic model with the
borrowing constraint and heterogeneous agents to answer this ques-
tion. In our framework, nancial development produces two com-
peting forces. One is the e¤ect which accelerates amplication by
strengthening balance sheet e¤ects. The other is the e¤ect which re-
duces it, we call shock cushioning e¤ects. Whether nancial develop-
ment exacerbates or dampens amplication depends on the balance of
two e¤ects. We nd that the relation between nancial development
and amplication is non-monotone: amplication initially increases
with nancial development and later falls down.
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1 Introduction
What are the e¤ects of the development of nancial markets on ampli-
cation over the business cycle? Traditional wisdom suggests that nancial
development stabilizes the economy by providing various channels for risk di-
versication. According to this view, nancial innovation not only promotes
long-run economic growth by enhancing e¢ ciency in resource allocation, but
also it helps to cushion consumers and producers from the e¤ects of economic
shocks.1 This classical view seems to have been widely accepted. Indeed, sev-
eral empirical and quantitative studies support the positive role of nancial
development in reducing volatility (See Cecchetti et al, 2006; Dynan et al,
2006; Jerman and Quadrini, 2008).
However, the situation has begun to change dramatically since the out-
break of the credit crisis of 2007-08. A new perspective has emerged: nancial
development destabilizes the economy by accelerating nancial amplication.
Before the crisis, it was often pointed out that thanks to nancial innova-
tion, the leverage of borrowers increased, and this high leverage generated
economic booms. However, once the credit crisis occurred, people began to
state that such a high leverage could lead to signicant damages in borrowers
balance sheets, and eventually in the nancial system as a whole. Financial
development is suddenly blamed for increasing volatility. Indeed, IMF (2006,
2008) supports this new view by presenting empirical evidences that in more-
advanced nancial systems, the shock propagation e¤ects become stronger.2
Motivated by these conicting views, this paper theoretically investigates
whether nancial development accelerates or dampens nancial amplication
(macroeconomic volatility). To do so, we propose a macroeconomic model
with the borrowing constraint and heterogeneous agents. In our model, -
nancial development produces two competing forces. One is the e¤ect which
accelerates amplication by strengthening balance sheet e¤ects.3 The other
is the e¤ect which dampens amplication, we call shock cushioning e¤ects.
1Levine (1997), Beck et al. (2000) show empirically that nancial development causes
long-run economic growth. Castro et al. (2004) and Khan and Ravikumar (2001) exam-
ine the impact of nancial development including investor protection and risk-sharing on
growth theoretically as well as empirically or numerically.
2IMF reports argue that the sensitivity of real GDP growth rate, corporate investment,
household consumption, and residential investment response to equity busts, or business
cycles, is increasing in more market-based nancial systems.
3See Bernanke et al. (1996) for balance sheet e¤ects.
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Depending on which of these dominates, whether nancial development ex-
acerbates or weakens nancial propagation is determined. Moreover, the
balance between these two conicting e¤ects changes according to the degree
of nancial development.
Our main result shows that in a low level of nancial development, while
shock cushioning e¤ects do not work well, nancial development enhances
balance sheet e¤ects through raising leverage, thereby accelerating nancial
amplication. However, once the level of development passes a certain de-
gree, shock cushioning e¤ects are generated through an adjustment of the
interest rate, which in turn weakens balance sheet e¤ects, thereby dampening
nancial amplication. Hence, the relation between nancial development
and nancial amplication is non-monotone: nancial amplication initially
increases with nancial development and later falls down.
This paper is related to a number of researches on business cycle theory
which emphasize the role of credit market imperfections. Following the sem-
inal work by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
some researchers put nancial factors a central role in accounting for business
uctuations (See Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki 1998, ; Bernanke et
al., 1999; Kocherlakota, 2000; Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004). These studies
demonstrate how shocks are amplied through balance sheet e¤ects, assum-
ing a xed degree of nancial development. The contribution of our paper is
to examine how the sensitivity to the shocks changes as the degree of nancial
development changes.
Our paper is also related to Cooley et al. (2004), Rajan (2006), and
Shin (2009) with regard to the e¤ects of nancial development on ampli-
cation (volatility). Cooley et al. emphasize a negative relation between
the degree of contract enforceability, which corresponds to the degree of -
nancial development in our paper, and aggregate volatility. They show that
economies in which contracts are less enforceable display greater volatility
of output than economies with stronger enforceability of contracts. The pa-
per generates only a monotone relation. Our paper, however, generates a
non-monotone dependence of volatility from nancial development. Rajan
argues that nancial development has made the world better o¤, however
it can accentuate real uctuations, and economies may be more exposed to
nancial-sector-induced turmoil than in the past. However, Rajan does not
necessarily propose a formal model of how nancial development accelerates
nancial amplication. Shin presents a theoretical model where securitiza-
tion by itself may not enhance nancial stability. Our study shows within
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one framework that nancial development initially accelerates amplication
and later reduces it.
Concerning this non-monotone relation between nancial development
and amplication, Aghion et al. (1999) and Matsuyama (2007, 2008) are
related to ours. Aghion et al. show that volatility is low when the develop-
ment level is low or high. High volatility (cycles in their paper) occurs when
the level has an intermediated value. Our paper also shows that volatil-
ity is high when nancial development is an intermediated level. However,
the source of high volatility is di¤erent from their paper. In their model,
a change in the interest rate has a role in increasing volatility while in our
model, it has a role in reducing volatility.4 In our model, high volatility is
caused by balance sheet e¤ects with high leverage. Matsuyama develops a
model of the borrowing constraint with various types of heterogeneities in an
overlapping generations framework, and shows how it leads to a wide range
of non-monotone phenomena. In Matsuyamas model, the source of non-
monotonicity lies in the investment projects which do not produce capital
goods. Matsuyama shows that a better credit market might be more prone
to nancing those investment projects, and such a change in credit allocation
generates non-monotonicity. In our paper, the source of non-monotonicity
lies in the adjustment of the interest rate which yields shock cushioning ef-
fects.
The paper is organized as follows. In the present paper, to demonstrate
e¤ectively how shock cushioning e¤ects work, in section 1, we rst present a
model without the presence of a storage technology. In such a framework, we
show that even though the borrowing constraint is binding, nancial ampli-
cation does not occur through the adjustment in the interest rate. In section
2, we introduce the storage technology. We demonstrate that because of the
presence of it, not only shocks get amplied through balance sheet e¤ects, but
also non-monotonicity emerges. Section 3 presents conclusion.
4In Aghion et al., a rise (decline) in the interest rate during booms (recessions) in-
creases (reduces) debts repayment, which in turn produces recessions (booms). In this
way, endogenous cycles with high volatility occur.
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2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with one homogenous goods and a con-
tinum of agents. At date t, a typical agent has expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
t log cit
#
; (1)
where i is the index for each agent, and cit is the consumption of him at date
t.  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E0 [x] is the expected value
of x conditional on information at date 0.
There are two types of the agents. Some of them are called entrepreneurs,
who have investment projects. The others are called investors, who do not
have them. The investment technology of the entrepreneurs follows:
yit+1 = z
i
t; (2)
where zit( 0) is the investment of goods at date t.  is the marginal pro-
ductivity of investment. yit+1 is the output at date t+ 1.
Each agent knows his own type at date t: whether he has investment or
not. But he only knows his type with probability after date t + 1. That
is, each agent shifts stochastically between two states according to a Markov
process: the state with or without investment. Specically, an agent who has
investment at date t may continue to have it at date t + 1 with probability
p. An agent who does not have it at date t may have it with probability
X(1   p). This switching probability is exogenous, and independent across
entrepreneurs and over time. Assuming that the initial ratio of the entrepre-
neurs and the investors is X : 1, the population ratio is constant over time.
We assume that the switching probability is not too large:
p > X(1  p): (3)
This assumption implies that there is a positive correlation between the
present period and the next period.
In this economy, there are agency frictions in a credit market. The en-
trepreneur can pledge at most a fraction  2 (0; 1] of the future returns from
his investment to creditors. In such a situation, in order for debt contracts
to be credible, debts repayment does not exceed the pledgable value. That
is, the borrowing constraint becomes
5
rtb
i
t  zit; (4)
where rt is the gross interest rate from date t to t+1, and bit is the amount of
borrowing at date t: The parameter  captures the degree of agency problems
in the credit market ( see Hart and Moore; 1994, and Tirole; 2006). In this
sense,  provides a simple measure of nancial development. In this paper,
we dene an increase in  as a nancial development.
The agents ow of funds constraint is given by
cit + z
i
t = y
i
t   rt 1bit 1 + bit: (5)
The left hand side of (5) is expenditure on consumption and investment.
The right hand side is nancing which comes from the returns from invest-
ment in the previous period minus debts repayment, which we call net worth
in this paper, yit   rt 1bit 1; and the amount of borrowing.
Each agent chooses consumption, investment, output, and borrowing
cit; z
i
t; y
i
t+1; b
i
t
	
to maximize the expected discounted utility (1) subject to
(2), (4), and (5). From the optimal behavior of the entrepreneurs, we see
that if  > rt; the entrepreneurs would borrow up to the limit. Hence the
borrowing constraint binds. If   rt; the constraint does not bind because
the rate of return on investment is equal to or less than the interest rate.
Let us denote aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs and the in-
vestors at date t as
P
i2mt c
i
t  Ct; and
P
i2nt c
i
t  C 0t, respectively, where
mt and nt are a families of the entrepreneurs and the investors at date t.
Similarly, let
P
i2mt z
i
t  Zt;
P
i2mt b
i
t  Bt; and
P
i2nt b
i
t  B0t be aggregate
investment, and the amount of borrowing of each type. Then, the market
clearing for goods, and credit are
Ct + C
0
t + Zt = Yt; (6)
Bt +B
0
t = 0; (7)
where
P
i2mt 1 y
i
t  Yt is the aggregate output at date t.
2.1 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices frtg1t=0 and quanti-
ties

cit; b
i
t; z
i
t; y
i
t+1; Ct; C
0
t; Bt; B
0
t; Zt; Yt
	1
t=0
which satises the conditions that
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(i) each agent maximizes utility, and (ii) the market for goods, and credit
all clear. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the agents have perfect
foresight about aggregate quantities in the equilibrium.
We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium behavior of the
entrepreneurs. For the moment, let us consider the case where the borrowing
constraint is binding, which means that  > rt:
As is well known, since the utility function is log, both the entrepreneurs
and the investors consume a fraction (1   ) of their net worth, cit = (1  
)(yit   rtbit 1). Then, by using (4), and (5), the investment function of the
agents who have the investment projects at date t becomes
zit =
(yit   rtbit 1)
1  
rt
: (8)
We see that the investment equals the leverage, 1= [1  (=rt)] times
savings, (yit rtbit 1). The leverage increases with : This implies that when
 is large, the entrepreneurs can nance more investment with smaller net
worth. We also see that the sensitivity of investment response to a change in
the net worth becomes higher with , which suggests that when the leverage
is high, even a small decline (increase) in the net worth can have a signicant
negative (positive) e¤ect on the investment.
From (8), since investment is a linear function of the net worth, we can
aggregate across the entrepreneurs to nd the law of motion of the aggregate
output:
Yt+1 = Zt = 
Et
1  
rt
; (9)
where Et 
P
i2mt(y
i
t   rt 1bit 1) is the aggregate net worth of the entrepre-
neurs at date t.
The movement of the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs evolves
according to
Et = p(Zt 1   rt 1Bt 1) +X(1  p)(rt 1Bt 1): (10)
The rst term of (10) represents the aggregate net worth of the agents
who continue to be entrepreneurs from the previous period. The second
term represents the aggregate net worth of the agents who switch to the
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entrepreneurs from the investors.
When the borrowing constraint is binding, rt 1Bt 1 = Yt holds. By
substituting this relation into (10), we can derive the law of motion of the
net worth share of the entrepreneurs, st  Et=Yt:
st = p(1  ) +X(1  p): (11)
The credit-market clearing, (7), can be written as

rt
Et
1  
rt
= E 0t; (12)
where E 0t 
P
i2nt(y
i
t   rt 1bit 1) is the aggregate net worth of the investors
at date t. In this economy, Yt = Et + E 0t holds. The left hand side of (12) is
the aggregate borrowing of the entrepreneurs, and the right hand side is the
aggregate lending of the investors.
Rearranging (12), we have
Et
1  
rt
= Yt: (13)
(13) means that the aggregate investment of the entrepreneurs (the left
hand side) equals the aggregate savings (the right hand side). (13) also
suggests that given Et and Yt; the interest rate adjusts such that all the
savings ow to the entrepreneursinvestment.
From (11) and (13), the equilibrium interest rate is
rt =

(1  p)= + p X(1  p) : (14)
We see that the interest rate increases with : This is because when  rises,
the borrowing constraint becomes relaxed, which results in a tighteness of the
credit market. Moreover, if  2 (0; 1=(1 +X)) ;  > r: Thus, the borrowing
constraint binds.
From (9) and (13), economic growth rate can be written as
gt  Yt+1
Yt
= : (15)
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We see that the growth rate is independent of wealth distribution or ;
even though the borrowing constraint is binding.
When  = 1=(1 + X); it is clear from (14) that the interest rate equals
the rate of return on investment. Indeed, in  2 [1=(1 +X); 1] ;
rt = : (16)
Hence the borrowing constraint no longer binds.5
Also in this case, since the aggregate savings ow to the entrepreneurs
investment, the growth rate of the economy is described as (15). The net
worth share of the entrepreneurs follow
st = pst 1 +X(1  p)(1  st 1): (17)
Thus, once an initial s0 is given, the economy converges to the steady
state.
The steady state of this economy is characterized by the value of .6 We
summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Without the presence of the storage technology, there are two
stages of nancial development, corresponding to two di¤erent values of .
The characteristics of each region are as follows:
(a) Region 1:  2 (0; 1) ; where 1  1=(1+X): The borrowing constraint
binds. The steady state values of g; s; and r satisfy
g = ; s = p(1  ) +X(1  p); r = 
(1  p)= + p X(1  p) : (18)
(b) Region 2:  2 [1; 1] : The borrowing constraint does not bind. The
steady state values satisfy
g = ; s =
X
1 +X
; r = : (19)
5rt >  can not be an equilibrium because if rt > ; all the agents are willing to lend,
and nobody would borrow.
6In  2 (0; 1=(1 +X)), since the interest rate is lower than the rate of return on
investment, income distribution is di¤erent between the entrepreneurs and the investors.
In  2 [1=(1 +X); 1], since both the entrepreneurs and the investors earn the same rate of
return, there is no di¤erence in income distribution.
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2.2 Dynamics
Now, let us examine how the growth rate of the economy responds to an
unexpected shock to productivity to investment. Suppose that at date    1
the economy is in the steady state of region 1: g 1 = g; s 1 = s; and
r 1 = r. There is then an unexpected shock: The entrepreneurs nd that
the returns from their investment at date  are (1  "). However, the shock
is known to be temporary. The productivity at date  + 1 and thereafter
returns to the normal level as in (2). Here we consider a negative shock (so
" is taken to be positive.). In this paper, we measure nancial amplication
(volatility) of a downward shock to be how far economic growth rate from 
to +1 jumps down from the steady-state growth rate through the borrowing
constraint.
From (15), we see that the economys growth rate from  to +1 remains
unchanged. In other words, no nancial amplication occurs. The question
is why is the growth rate not a¤ected even if the shock hits the economy?
In order to make it clear, let us investigate a response in the interest rate by
this shock. The equilibrium in the credit market at date  is
s
1  
r
= 1: (20)
(20) implies that the interest rate in period t depends on the share of the
net worth of the entrepreneurs at date t.
By using (10), the net worth share of the entrepreneurs at date  can be
written as
s =
p(1     ") +X(1  p)
1  " : (21)
Thus, we obtain an expression for the equilibrium interest rate at date  :
r =
(1  ")
(1  p)(1  ") + [p X(1  p)]  : (22)
From (22), we see that the interest rate declines at the time of the shock.
This results in dampening nancial amplication. Intuition is that following
the shock, the net worth share of the entrepreneurs declines. Because of
this, the borrowing constraint becomes tightened, which causes investment
to decrease. That is, balance sheet e¤ects occur. On the other hand, together
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with the shock, the interest rate goes down in the credit market, which in
turn relaxes the borrowing constraint. That is, the adjustment of the interest
rate produces shock cushioning e¤ects, which o¤sets balace sheet e¤ects. As
a result, nancial amplication does not occur.
This result contrasts with conventional wisdom proposed by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which suggests that
when the borrowing constraint is binding, an unexpected productivity shock
get amplied through balance sheet e¤ects. This di¤erence lies in the interest
rate. In our model, the adjustment in the interest rate plays a crucial role
in reducing amplication. On the other hand, in Bernanke and Gertler and
Kiyotaki and Moore, the interest rate is xed. Hence the adjustment does
not operate.
In region 2, even if the economy is hit by the shock, since the nancial
system is well developed, it can transfer all the savings to the entrepreneurs
without the adjustment of the interest rate. Note that in region 2, the interest
rate is stick to : Thus, the growth rate of the economy at date  remain
unchanged.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Without the presence of the storage technology, no nancial
amplication occurs even if the borrowing constraint is binding, because shock
cushioning e¤ects o¤set balance sheet e¤ects.
3 Introducing a storage technology
In the model above, the investors, who do not have the investment technology,
have no choice but to lend. Suppose now that the investors have an access to
the storage technology, which earns a return equal to  <  per unit. This
storage technology can be interpreted as the investment projects without
agency fricitions, but with low returns. The model in this section is simillar
to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or especially Kiyotaki (1998).
Since the investors may invest in the storage technology, the goods market
clearing, (6), changes into
Ct + C
0
t + Zt +Xt = Yt; (23)
where
P
i2nt x
i
t  Xt; and
P
i2mt 1 z
i
t +
P
i2nt 1 x
i
t  Yt:
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In describing the aggregate economy, let us consider the case where the
borrowing constraint binds for the enterpreneurs, which implies
  rt < : (24)
In equilibrium, the interest rate would be at least as high as :7 This
implies that the presence of the storage technology creates a lower bound on
the interest rate.
When we aggregate across agents, we derive the law of motion of the
aggregate output as follows:
Yt+1 = 
Et
1  
rt
+ 
0BB@Yt   Et
1  
rt
1CCA : (25)
The rst and second terms of (25) are the the returns from the investment
of the entrepreneurs and the ones from the storage technology of the investors,
respectively. As shown in the parenthesis of (25), the aggregate amount
of the storage technology equals the aggregate savings minus the aggregate
investment of the entrepreneurs. If rt = ; the investors would use the
storage technology, and hence the second term would be positive. If rt > ;
it would become zero because they do not have incentives to use the storage
technology, which corresponds to region 1 in the previous section. In this
case, the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy follow (14), and
(15).
When the second term is positive, the growth rate of the economy can be
written as
gt  Yt+1
Yt
=

1 +

  
  

st

: (26)
(26) implies that economic growth rate increases with nancial devel-
opment. Intuitively, when nancial development improves, the borrowing
constraint becomes relaxed. In the credit market, more savings ow to the
investment projects of the entrepreneurs from the storage technology. This
change in the allocation of credit causes economic growth.
Aggregate TFP at date t is dened as follows:
7rt <  can not be an equilibrium because nobody would lend.
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Tt =
Yt+1
Zt +Xt
=

1 +

  
  

st

: (27)
By using (27), economic growth rate is rewritten as
gt = Tt: (28)
From (28), we see that economic uctuations are caused by the changes in
the aggregate TFP. In this sense, our model seems to be simillar to standard
real business cycle model. However, in the present model, the aggregate
TFP is endogenously determined depending on saving allocations between
the investment projects of the entrepreneurs and the storage technology.
The movement of the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs evolves
according to
Et = p(Zt 1   rt 1Bt 1) +X(1  p)(Xt + rt 1Bt 1): (29)
Note that the second term includes the returns from the storage technol-
ogy, which is di¤erent from the previous section.
By using (25) and (29), the net worth share of the entrepreneurs follow
st+1 =
p
(1  )
   st +X(1  p)(1  st)
1 +
  
  st
 (st; ): (30)
If rt = ; the dynamic evolution of the economy is characterized by the
recursive equilibrium: (Yt+1; gt; Tt; st+1; ) that satises (25), (26), (27), (28),
and (30) as functions of the state variables (Yt; st):
3.1 Steady State Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium of this economy depends upon the degree of -
nancial development. That is, we have the following proposition (Proof is in
Appendix 1).
Proposition 3 With the presence of the storage technology, there are three
stages of nancial development, corresponding to three di¤erent values of .
The characteristics of each region are as follows:
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(3-a) Region 1-1:  2 (0; 2) ; where 2  (1  p)= [=  p+X(1  p)] :
The borrowing constraint is binding. The investors put some of their savings
in the storage technology. The steady state values of g; s; and r satisfy
g =

1 +

  
  

s

; s = (s; ); r = : (31)
(3-b) Region 1-2:  2 (2; 1) : The borrowing constraint is binding. Only
the entrepreneurs invest. The steady state values satisfy (18).
(3-c) Region 2:  2 [1; 1] : The borrowing constraint is not binding. Only
the entrepreneurs invest. The steady state values satisfy (19).
In region 1-1 where nancial development is low, the nancial system can
not transfer all the savings to the investment projects of the entrepreneurs.
In the credit market, some of the savings in the economy ow to the storage
technology. In this sense, saving allocation is ine¢ cient. As nancial devel-
opment improves, more savings are allocated to the investment projects with
high returns. This improvement in the saving allocation boosts economic
growth. However, the interest rate is unchanged in this region.8 We should
note here that this region is a newly created one due to the presence of the
storage technology. Also this region corresponds to the economy Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki (1998) analyze.
In region 1-2 where nancial development is high, but not so high, the
situation changes. As nancial markets develop, the interest rate starts rising
because of the tightness in the credit market. Since only the entrepreneurs
produce goods, the growth rate of the economy becomes constant, and in-
dependent of ; even though the borrowing constraint is still binding. This
implies that once the nancial system is developed to some degree, it can
transfer enough savings to the entrepreneurs from the investors. Region 1-2
is simillar to the property of region 1 in the previous section.
When nancial markets grow further and reaches region 2, the borrowing
constraint does not bind. All the savings ow to the investment projects of
the entrepreneurs as in region 1-2.
8In this respect, our model is similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In their model, when
information asymmetry is large, the interest rate is insensitive. Similarly, in our model,
when nancial development is low, the interest rate is sticky.
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3.2 Dynamics
Now, let us look at how this economy responds to an unexpected shock. As
in the previous case, suppose that at date    1 the economy is in the steady
state: g 1 = g; s 1 = s and r 1 = r. There is then an unexpected
shock to productivity: both the returns from the investment projects and
the storage technology decline unexpectedly by ": First, we consider region
1-1.
From (26), (29), and (30), we obtain
Amplication  dg+1
d"
j"=0 =

  
  

ds
d"
j"=0 < 0: (32)
Since the entrepreneurs have a net debt in the aggregate, and debts repay-
ment does not change by this shock, the net worth share of the entrepreneurs
decreases at date  ; ds=d" < 0 (See Appendix 2). Because the adjustment of
the interest rate does not work well in region 1-1, their borrowing constraint
becomes tightened. As a result, they are forced to cut back on their invest-
ment. That is, balance sheet e¤ects occur. At the same time, more savings
ow to the storage technology. That is, what is called ight to quality also
occurs. Through these two e¤ects, the aggregate TFP declines, so that eco-
nomic growth rate from  to  +1 jumps down from the steady state growth
rate. This result is simillar to the one shown in Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
or Kiyotaki (1998).9 What we want to analyze in this paper is whether these
propagation e¤ects are exacerbated or dampened by nancial development.
By di¤erentiating (32) with respect to ; we obtain
@2g+1
@@"
j"=0 = @
@

  
  

| {z }

@s
@"
j"=0| {z }
	
+

  
  

@2s
@@"
j"=0| {z }
	
 < 0: (33)
The rst term of (33) represents the sensitivity of the entrepreneursin-
vestment response to a change in the net worth share. Since it becomes
higher with  (high leverage), the entrepreneurs are forced to reduce their
investment substantially by even a small decline in the net worth share. The
9We should note that the presence of the storage technology plays a crucial role in
producing nancial amplication, because it creates a new region (region 1-1) where shock
cushioning e¤ects are not generated.
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second term represents the degree of a decline in the net worth share. It
says that the decline by itself becomes larger with  (See Appendix 2). This
implies that when  is high, the leverage also rises. In such a situation, even
a small negative productivity shock can cause a large decline in the net worth
share. Taken together, the entrepreneurs have to make deeper cuts in their
investment. Moreover, this causes a substantial credit shift from the invest-
ment projects with high returns to the storage technology with low returns.
That is, balance sheet e¤ects and ight to quality are signicant. Hence, in
region 1-1, nancial development accelerates nancial amplication e¤ects,
thereby leading to increased macroeconomic volatility.
However, once the economy enters region 1-2, the situation changes dra-
matically. The adjustment of the interest rate starts operating, which gen-
erates shock cushioning e¤ects as in region 1 of the previous section. As a
result, nancial amplication is dampened. This implies that once nancial
development passes a certain degree, the adjustment of the interest rate re-
covers, so that even if the economy is hit by the shock, the shock does not
get amplied. Financial development leads to macroeconomic stability.
When nancial development reaches region 2, no nancial amplication
occurs because the nancial system can allocate all the savings to the in-
vestment projects with high returns without the adjustment of the interest
rate.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 With the presence of the storage technology, the relation be-
tween nancial development and nancial amplication is non-monotone: -
nancial amplication initially increases with nancial development (in region
1-1) and later falls down (in region 1-2 and 2).
This non-monotonicity is consistent with empirical studies. For exam-
ple, Easterly et al. (2000) demonstrate that the relation between nancial
development and growth volatility is non-monotone. They show that while
developed nancial systems o¤er oppurtunities for stabilization, they may
also imply higher leverage of rms and thus more risks and less stability. A
recent study by Kunieda (2008) also show empirically that the relation is
hump-shaped, i.e., in early stages of nancial development, as the nancial
sector develops in an economy, it becomes highly volatile. However, as the
nancial sector matures further, the volatility starts to reduce once again.
Based on the above analysis, we might be able to explain why we observe
two conicting views. The traditional view might discuss region 1-2 or 2
16
where nancial markets are well developed. Indeed, in Arrow-Debreu econ-
omy where there is no agency friction in the credit market,  is equal to one.
On the other hand, the new view might discuss region 1-1 where nancial
development is not so high, and there are agency frictions to some degree in
nancial markets. In this sense, the discrepancy between two views might
arise from the di¤erence in the degree of nancial development.10 We depict
this situation in Figure 1. In the Figure, we take  in horizontal axis, and
in vertical axis, we take the magnitude of amplication. It is shown that the
relation between  and the magnitude is non-monotone.
This non-monotonicity has impliciations for the relation between growth
and macroeconomic volatility. That is, in region 1-1, nancial development
causes economic growth. However, once negative productivity shocks hit the
economy, downward amplication is signicant since the economy is highly
leveraged. In this sense, there is a trade-o¤ between higher economic growth
and macroeconomic stability. But, once nancial development reaches region
1-2 or 2, both go together.
Moreover, our model may also have implications for asymmetric move-
ments of business uctuations. As Kocherlakota (2000) emphasizes, macro-
economics looks for an asymmetric amplication and propagation mechanism
that can turn small shocks to the economy into the business cycle uctua-
tions. Our model might deliver this. For example, if the economy is around
2; to positive productivity shocks, even though the borrowing constraint is
binding for the entrepreneurs, the economy will not respond upwardly be-
cause the interest rate will go up in the credit market. On the other hand, to
negative productivity shocks, it will react downwardly because the interest
rate does not adjust.11
10You may wonder why large downward amplication occurs repeatedly in the real
economy where nancial development keeps increasing over time, even though our model
suggests that nancial amplication eventually becomes small in high  region. Here is
one interpretation from this model. In this model, the important factor which a¤ects the
size of nancial amplication is H ; which is put on high protable investment, not on
low protable investment. Considering this point, think about the case where the existing
projects with L disappper, and new investment opportunities with higher protability
than the existing H come into the economy. In such a situation, the  which is put on
those new investment projects matters. If the  is low, the economy will get into region 1
again even if it was in region 2 or 3 before. In the real economy, this process might repeats
itself.
11Here we consider small shocks. However, if we think about relatively large productivity
shocks, business uctuations may become asymmetric, even if the economy is far from 2.
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We summarize this result in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 If the level of nancial development is around 2; business
uctuations are asymmetric.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a macroeconomic model of credit market imperfections
with heterogeneous agents in order to investigate whether nancial devel-
opment exacerbates or dampens nancial amplication. In our framework,
nancial development produces two competing forces. One is the e¤ect which
accelerates amplication by strengthening balance sheet e¤ects. The other
is the e¤ect which dampens amplication, we call shock cushioning e¤ects.
Depending on which of these dominates, whether nancial development ex-
acerbates or weakens nancial propagation is determined. Moreover, the
balance between these two conicting e¤ects changes according to the level
of nancial development.
We show that in a low level of nancial development, while shock cush-
ioning e¤ects do not work well, nancial development enhances balance sheet
e¤ects through raising leverage, thereby accelerating nancial amplication.
However, once the level of development passes a certain degree, nancial de-
velopment generates shock cushioning e¤ects, which in turn weakens balance
sheet e¤ects, thereby dampening nancial amplication. Hence, the relation
between nancial development and nancial amplication is non-monotone:
nancial amplication initially increases with nancial development and later
falls down.
As future research, the next step would be that we want to develop quan-
titative assessment into the relation between the development of nancial
markets and volatility of the economy. Another step would be to consider
the welfare cost of volatility in a heterogeneous agents model with aggregate
uncertainty. These directions will be promising.
In the case with relatively large positive shocks, positive propagation occurs, but the
degree of it is weakened because the adjustment of the interest rate works. However, to
the negative shocks, because the adjustment does not work, the economy experiences large
downward propagation.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition (3-a)
First, we derive 2: 2 is the value which satises st+1 = (st; ) when we
put st = st+1 = 1  =:
Next, we prove that if  2 (0; 2), rt =  and Z 0t > 0 hold in the neigh-
borhood of the steady state: In order to prove this, we need to check that the
investors invest positive amounts of goods. From the goods-market clearing
condition, Z 0t becomes
Z 0t = Yt
0BB@1  st
1  

1CCA : (34)
From (34), we observe that whether Z 0t is positive or zero depends upon
the value of the right hand side. If  = 2; s() = 1  = holds. Thus, we
have Z 0t = 0. If  < 2; from (30), s
() < 1   = holds. Thus, we have
Z 0t > 0.
Appendix 2
Since the returns from investment of both agents decrease by  at date  ;
(25) and (29) change into
Y = (1  ")
2664 E 1
1  
r 1
+ 
0BB@Y 1   E 1
1  
r 1
1CCA
3775 ; (35)
E = p

(1  ")Z 1   r 1B 1

+X(1  p) (1  ")Z 0
 1 + r 1B 1

:
(36)
Using (35) and (36), we obtain s as follows:
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s =
p
(1  )
   s 1 +X(1  p)(1  s 1)  "

p

  s 1 +X(1  p)(1 

  s 1)

(1  ")

1 +
  
  s 1
 :
(37)
From (37), di¤erentiating s with respect to ", we have
@s
@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]  s

  + (  )s < 0: (38)
And then, by using (38), we have
@2s
@@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]
 @s

@
(  )  s   (  )s2
[  + (  )s]2 < 0: (39)
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